reverse proxy to secure solr, rejecting requests that might modify the solr index.


Node.js based reverse proxy to make a solr instance read-only, rejecting requests that have the potential to modify the solr index.

Intended for use with the AJAX-Solr library and similar applications.

First, install the dependencies:

npm install

Now run the tests:

npm test # run the test once

To start the proxy server with default options, and have it auto-restart on changes to code, do the following:

npm start 

To start the server from your own app, potentially overriding some default options:

var SolrSecurityProxy = require('solr-security-proxy');
SolrSecurityProxy.start(8008, {validPaths: ['/solr/core1/select']);

Here are the default options:

var defaultOptions = {
  invalidHttpMethods: ['POST'],     // all other HTTP methods (eg GET, HEAD, PUT, etc) will be allowed 
  validPaths: ['/solr/select'],     // all other paths will be denied 
  invalidParams: ['qt', 'stream'],  // blocks requests with params qt or stream.* (all other params are allowed) 
  validatorfunction(){},          // customized validator function; receives (request, options) as arguments 
  backend: {                        // proxy to solr at this location 
    host: 'localhost',
    port: 8080

The accompanying Vagrantfile sets up an ubuntu-based node.js stack: To use it to develop the solr-security-proxy:

vagrant up
vagrant ssh
cd /vagrant
# to run the tests
npm test
# ... or continuously (-L is important for Vagrant compatibility)
./node_modules/.bin/nodemon -L test/test-solr-security-proxy.js 
# to start the server on the default settings
npm start
# ... or continuously (-L is important for Vagrant compatibility)
./node_modules/.bin/nodemon -L solr-security-proxy.js

For my notes on learning node.js development while building this module, see

Without this proxy, the following requests can cause trouble:

# access to /solr/admin
# addition of a new document, via POST to /solr/update
curl \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  --data-binary '<add><doc><field name="id">testdoc</field></doc></add>'
# deleting of all documents, via POST to /solr/update
curl \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  --data-binary '<delete><query>*:*</query></delete>'
# deleting all the documents, via GET to /update?stream.body=<delete><query>*:*</query></delete>&commit=true
# Triggering remote streaming via GET to /solr/select\
#   ?stream.url=\
#   &stream.body=<delete><query>*:*</query></delete>
# See
# deleting of all documents, via GET to 
#   /solr/select?qt=/update&stream.body=<delete><query>*:*</query></delete>
# See
# See

Currently, solr-security-proxy addresses these holes by applying the following rules:

  • Reject any POST requests
  • Only accept other requests (GET, HEAD, etc...) at "/solr/select"
  • Block requests with the following query params: qt, stream.*

If there are other types of requests that should be blocked, please open an issue.

Even with the proxy, the entirety of your solr index is world accessible. If you need to lock it down further, consider maintaining a second core with only public data, or implementing additional Solr request handlers (via solr-config.xml) that specify certain query invariants.

At the moment, the proxy blacklists the parameters qt and stream.*. It's likely considerably safer instead whitelist only the parameters your application uses, instead.

Furthermore, this proxy does not guard against simple D.O.S. attacks against solr, for example see this post on Solr DOS by David Smiley.

Finally, this proxy will not do anything unless you actually ensure that your Solr container is only being server at If you're using Tomcat with the proxy on the same machine, then add the following to your solr instance's server.xml:

<Valve className="org.apache.catalina.valves.RemoteAddrValve" allow="127\.0\.0\.1"/>

For more info about solr security issues, see:

  • (remote streaming bug)
  • (?qt=/update hole)
  • (?qt=/update hole, part 2)

For other solr security proxies, see