Neptunium, Promethium, Manganese
Severity: high

Sensitive data exposure in NATS

nats

Overview

Preview versions of two NPM packages and one Deno package from the NATS project contain an information disclosure flaw, leaking options to the NATS server; for one package, this includes TLS private credentials.

The connection configuration options in these JavaScript-based implementations were fully serialized and sent to the server in the client's CONNECT message, immediately after TLS establishment.

The nats.js client supports Mutual TLS and the credentials for the TLS client key are included in the connection configuration options; disclosure of the client's TLS private key to the server has been observed.

Most authentication mechanisms are handled after connection, instead of as part of connection, so other authentication mechanisms are unaffected. For clarity: NATS account NKey authentication is NOT affected.

Neither the nats.ws nor the nats.deno clients support Mutual TLS: the affected versions listed below are those where the logic flaw is present. We are including the nats.ws and nats.deno versions out of an abundance of caution, as library maintainers, but rate as minimal the likelihood of applications leaking sensitive data.

Affected versions:

Security impact:

NPM package nats.js: mainline is unaffected beta branch is vulnerable from 2.0.0-201, fixed in 2.0.0-209 Logic flaw:

NPM package nats.ws: status: preview flawed from 1.0.0-85, fixed in 1.0.0-111 Deno repository https://github.com/nats-io/nats.deno status: preview flawed in all git tags prior to fix fixed with git tag v1.0.0-9 Impact:

For deployments using TLS client certificates (for mutual TLS), private key material for TLS is leaked from the client application to the server. If the server is untrusted (run by a third party), or if the client application also disables TLS verification (and so the true identity of the server is unverifiable) then authentication credentials are leaked.

Remediation

Upgrade to version 2.0.0-209 or later

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Advisory timeline

  1. published

    Advisory Published
    Oct 8th, 2020
  2. reported

    Reported by Unknown
    Oct 8th, 2020